NLRB as Protector of Employees from Discharge for Making Suggestions to Management by unknown
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 24 | Issue 2 Article 8
Winter 1949
NLRB as Protector of Employees from Discharge
for Making Suggestions to Management
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation





NLRB AS PROTECTOR OF EMPLOYEES FROM DIS-
CHARGE FOR MAKING SUGGESTIONS
TO MANAGEMENT
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has recently held that the National Labor
Relations Act prevented an employer's discharging employ-
ees solely because they met and formulated suggestions to
be made to management. This is the first instance where
protection has been granted to an employee activity which
involved neither self-organization nor collective bargaining.
The right of employees to suggest was found in the "mutual
aid or protection" clause of Section 7 of the Act.
A group of insurance salesmen, employees of the Phoe-
nix Mutual Life Insurance Company, learned that the Com-
pany's cashier was about to retire. Feeling that their own
financial welfare in part depended upon whether the
cashier's duties were performed efficiently, the salesmen met
to draft a letter to the branch manager, profferring their
ideas and suggestions regarding the appointment of the
cashier's successor. The branch manager learned of the
meeting and discharged Davis and Johnson, two salesmen
who had been active in the preparation of the letter. There
was no other apparent ground for the discharge. No ques-
tion of self-organization was involved; the salesmen be-
longed to no union. Davis and Johnson petitioned the NLRB
for re-instatement, charging that their discharge was an in-
terference with employee rights guaranteed them by Section
71 of the NLRA, and was therefore an unfair labor practice
under Sections 8 (1) and 8 (3)2 of the Act. The Board
sustained the contention of the discharged salesmen and
1. Section 7. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection." 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C.
§ 157 (1940), prior to amendment by Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, 61 STAT. 140, 29 U. S. C. A. § 157 (Supp. 1947).
2. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (1940), providing that it
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to: § 8 (1):
"Interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in § 7." § 8 (3): "By discrimination
in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condi-
tion of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization: ... 1'
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ordered Phoenix to re-instate them.3 On the Board's peti-
tion to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals the order was
enforced. The Court stated that although Phoenix might
disregard the salesmen's suggestions, it could not interfere
with their right to make suggestions concerning the cashier's
successor, this being, under the circumstances, a matter
reasonably related to their conditions of employment. NLRB
v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983 (C. C. A. 7th
1948), cert. denied, 69 S. Ct. 68 (1948).
Voluminous are the cases interpretating those portions
of Section 7 which protect the employee activities of self-
organization, of forming, joining, and assisting labor organi-
zations, of bargaining collectively, and of engaging in con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining.
Because of the absence of such activities in the Phoenix case,
there was presented for the first time a fact situation re-
quiring interpretative application of that portion of Section
7 which states that employees 4 have a right "to engage in
concerted activities" for their "mutual aid or protection."
The court held that these words of the Statute shielded em-
ployees in taking action with a view toward making sug-
gestions to management about matters "reasonably relating
to conditions of their employment."5 It would be incorrect
to term the decision "new law." For that part of Section 7
applied in this case has been a part of the NLRA since its
enactment. Rather, the decision pours into the mold con-
structed by Congress the substance of a concrete fact situa-
tion. Putting aside, as did the court, any question whether
the activity of suggesting falls within a broad definition of
collective bargaining and hence achieves protection under
that portion of Section 7 dealing with organization and col-
lective bargaining, 6 still suggesting has important factual
3. In the Matter of Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company, 73
NLRB 1463 (1947).
4. A portion of the Phoenix decision not dealt with here decides that
the salesmen in the case were "employees" within § 2 (3) of the
NLRA. 49 STAT. 450 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 152 (1940).
5. NLRB v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 988 (C. C.
A. 7th 1948), cert. denied, 69 S. Ct. 68 (1948).
6. Section 8 (d) of the LMRA of 1947 gives a definition of col-
lective bargaining. "For the purposes of this section, to bargain
collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the
employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the
[Vol.: 24
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differences from activities previously held to be encompassed
within the rights accorded employees by Section 7. The
"mutual aid or protection" clause seems to protect activity
unrelated to efforts to organize or to formulate the terms
of a contract, for the simple act of suggesting is certainly
directed toward neither of those ends.
The Phoenix case holds that an employer may not dis-
charge employees who seek simply to make suggestions to
him. Perhaps also he may not take other action inconsistent
with the protection accorded to the communication of sug-
gestions. The facts required no decision upon the question
whether employees may strike or engage in other coercive
activity to force their suggestions upon their employer but
there are strong indications that they may not. Admittedly,
employees may take coercive action in relation to those activi-
ties which are part of and culminate in a collective bargain-
ing agreement.7 A prior decision by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals seems to justify the conclusion that coer-
cive activity in relation to the "mutual aid or protection"
clause would not be protected and that an employer would
be privileged to discharge for coercion., That the purpose
of protecting activity aimed simply at suggesting seems to
be to promote the interchange of ideas is consonant with
this conclusion.
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agree-
ment reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession: Provided ..... " 61 STAT. 140, 29 U. S.
C. A. § 158 (d) (Supp. 1947). As thus defined it would seem
that "collective bargaining" designates only the process of nego-
tiating contracts and does not encompass discussions not intended
to culminate in contract.
7. The type of activity previously protected under § 8 (1) is typified
in the following cases: NLRB v. Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773 (C. C.
A. 5th 1945), circulation of union membership applications;
NLRB v. Rockingham Poultry Co., 59 NLRB 486 (1944), petition
for higher wages; Carter Carburetor Corp. v. NLRB, 140 F.2d
714 (C. C. A. 8th 1944), work stoppage to protest the discharge
of a fellow-employee because of his union activities; NLRB v.
Ever Ready Label Corp., 54 NLRB 551 (1944), presentation of
grievances by employee on behalf of his department; NLRB v.
Remington Rand, 130 F.2d 919 (C. C. A. 2d 1942), strike to
protest conditions of employment; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S.
516 (1945), organization for purpose of collective bargaining and
whatever concerted activity may be necessary to preserve such
organization.
8. NLRB v. Reynolds Pen. Co., 162 F.2d 680 (C. C. A. 7th 1947).
See also United Mine Workers v. Fontaine Converting Wks., 77
NLRB No. 216 (1948).
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The obvious and declared purpose of labor relations
legislation, which purpose is clearly continued in the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947, is to foster industrial
peace.' Congress has evidenced its conviction that harmon-
ious relations between labor and management are most ef-
fectually engendered through a process of collective bargain-
ing which demands a good faith exchange of views'0 and
an airing of ends sought. In view of this basic statutory
policy, it is probable that the present decision is both de-
sirable and justifiable, since its effect will be further to
foster interchange of ideas. Although this decision might
be objected to as being without support in precedent the
obvious answer is that the problem was one of first impres-
sion.
As pointed out above, Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees
to employees the right to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining "or other mutual aid
or protection." In Congressional reports explaining the pur-
pose of Section 7 all emphasis is directed toward the activi-
ties of organization and collective bargaining.1 No explana-
tion is offered for the inclusion of the last six words, "or
other mutual aid or protection," other than a statement that
they were carried over into the Act from Section 7 (a) of
9. See policy sections: National Labor Relations Act, § 1, 49 STAT.
449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1940); Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, §§ 1 (b), 101, 201, 61 STAT. 136, 29 U. S. C. A.
§§ 141, 151, 171 (Supp. 1947); Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction
Act, § 2, 47 STAT. 70 (1932) ; 29 U. S. C. § 102 (1940) ; H. R. REP.
No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1935).
10. See National Labor Relations Act, as amended by Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, § 8 (d), note 6 supra.
The National Labor Relations Act, as amended, provides in
§ 8 (c) : " . . . expressions of any views . . . shall not constitute,
or be evidence of, an unfair labor practice under any of the pro-
visions of this act, if such expression contains no threat of re-
prisal or force or promise of benefit." Although this subsection
is included within the larger section dealing with unfair labor
practices, legislative history indicates that it is applicable only
as a defense to such a charge, and not to define the limits of
employees' rights under § 7. Conference Report, H. R. REP. No.
510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947). From this subsection, how-
ever, Congressional intention to protect free expression of views
on the part of both employers and employees is apparent. Con-ference Report, H. R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45
(1947).
11. See SEN. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935); H. R. REP.
No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1935); Conference Report, H.
R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1947).
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the National Industrial Recovery Act. 2  Nor in the reports
on Section 7 (a) of the NLRA is there any indication re-
garding the significance of these words, which also ap-
peared, without interpretation, in the Norris-LaGuardia An-
ti-Injunction Act.13  One may wonder with what intent the
legislators included these words in the NLRA. Congress,
quite possibly, may have added them as a matter of tradition,
having no specific substantive content for them in mind. At
any rate, there is little affirmative support for the Phoenix
decision to be found in the legislative history of these words.
In this situation it is for the Board to work out the applica-
tion of the section, keeping in mind the policy underlying
the NLRA.
14
And though the case authority relied upon to support
the position in the Phoenix case seems to be of questionable
applicability,15 this too affords slight grounds for criticism
of the decision of a novel question. The Board's determina-
12. 48 STAT. 198 (1934).
13. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 102 (1940).
14. It is the function of the National Labor Relations Board to re-
solve the conflict among the interests of labor, management, and
the public. See National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U. S. 350,
364 (1940); NLRB v. Illinois Tool Co., 153 F.2d 811, 816 (C. C.
A. 7th 1946); NLRB v. Barrett, 120 F.2d 583, 585 (C. C. A. 7th
1941).
15. The Board found sole major support in the case of NLRB v.
Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Choc. Co., 130 F.2d 503 (C. C. A. 2d
1942). In that case the union published a protest condemning
their employer's action in aiding the latter's milk supplier to
break a "strike" to raise prices by a rival of the supplier. Judge
Learned Hand upheld the Board's determination that it was
an unfair labor practice under the "mutual aid or protection"
clause for the employer to discharge the union president in
retaliation. While the effect of that case was to protect the
union in announcing its views, it is important to note the reason
behind the decision: Judge Hand stated that consistent with
his interpretation of Section 7, secondary boycotts and sympathy
strikes would also be protected under the "mutual aid or pro-
tection" clause. It seems apparent that he was focusing attention
upon the word "mutual" and that the thrust of his argument
was that where there is sufficient economic relation between the
welfare of two different groups of employees, one group will be
protected by Section 7 if it takes action to aid the other. Further,
Judge Hand's suggestion that coercive activity would be pro-
tected indicates that he was not finding in Section 7 a right
simply to express views upon a matter about which the employer
had no duty to bargain. If the foregoing analysis of the Swiss
case is accurate, that case's interpretation of "mutual aid or pro-
tection" is entirely unlike the interpretation in the Phoenix case.
Indeed, Judge Hand's interpretation necessarily has fallen with
the passage of § 8 (b) (4) of the Labor Managament Relations
Act of 1947 making secondary boycotts an unfair labor practice.
61 STAT. 140, 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (b) (4) (Supp. 1947).
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tion to protect the salesmen in their effort to communicate
their views to the Phoenix Company seems to foster indus-
trial peace and thus to effectuate the policy of the Statute.
No more should be expected. Nor is any vice in the decision
to be found in its appraisal of the Board's test to delimit
the activities protected under the "mutual aid or protection"
clause: the matters about which employees may make sug-
gestions must have some "reasonable relation to conditions
of their employment." Recent labor law history gives
abundant warning to courts to avoid attempts to solve in-
volved questions of labor relations by formulating inflexible
rules of law. 7 Reasonable relationship seems eminently
workable and it leaves the Board the latitude necessary to
the solution of diverse factual problems.
One factor may be suggested as a proper guide in deter-
mining the area of reasonable relationships. As enunciated,
the Board takes into account only the interests of employees.
But the policy of our most recent labor legislation is to bal-
ance the interests of labor, management, and the public.t,
16. " . . . we believe that what these salesmen did was closely related
to their legitimate interests as employees. In essence, their
activity consisted of common discussion of circumstances which
they considered elements of a grievance concerning their working
conditions, and preparation of a method for presenting thegrievance to their employer. This was reasonable and temperate
conduct by employees who had a real cause for concern and was
clearly within the scope of the kind of concerted activity protectedby Section 7 of the Act." In the matter of Phoenix Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 73 NLRB 1463, 1464 (1947).
17. E.g., in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U. S. 680, 691(1945), a case involving the Fair Labor Standards Act, it washeld that as a matter of law the time spent by employees in
walking to work on the employer's premises must be compensated
as work. It was estimated that as a result of a multitude of suits
filed after this decision, fabulous sums would have to be paid
by employers as back pay, the financial structure of many busi-
nesses would be seriously endangered, and the federal treasury
disrupted. To alleviate these hardships Congress enacted the
Portal-to-Portal Act. See Section 1, "Findings and Policy," 61
STAT. 84, 29 U. S. C. A. § 251 (Supp. 1947).
18. Labor Managament Relations Act, § 1 (b), 61 STAT. 186, 29 U. S.
C. A. § 141 (Supp. 1947); SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1stSess. 1 (1947). Although § 7 of the NLRA was amended by the
LMRA of 1947 (see note 1 supra), the Phoenii case seems un-
affected. Section 7 was amended by adding to it: " and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected
by an a greement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3)."Since emphasis is now placed on the right of employees to ri'ef rainfrom organization, collective bargaining, etc., it would seem that
the informal meeting and the making of suggestions protected
by the Plhoenix case actually draw support from the amended
Section 7,
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The protecti6n of a particular expression of views should in-
volve a determination that the expression has some reason-
able relation to conditions of employment, but also that the
interests of management and the public are not thereby un-
reasonably encroached upon. So formulated, the Phoenix
test would focus the attention of the Board and the courts
upon the economic and social bases of that case's doctrine,
thus assuring the development of a beneficial application of
the mutual aid or protection clause.
LIBEL
APPLICATION OF SINGLE PUBLICATION RULE TO
PUBLISHER OF BOOKS
There is an obvious potentiality for conflict between the
rule that each publication of a libel is a separate tort and
the policy of the statute of limitations that all actionable
wrongs must eventually be put in repose. In cases involv-
ing libelous periodicals, some modern courts have resolved
the conflict in favor of the policy of the statute of limita-
tions. Resolution has been effected by resort to a legal
fiction, the "single publication rule." This rule, which re-
gards all the steps attendant on the mass distribution of
periodicals as but a single act, a single publication, has here-
tofore been limited in application to cases dealing with news-
papers and magazines. In a case of first impression,' the
New York Court of Appeals has extended the single publica-
tion rule and applied it to the distribution of books.
Total Espionage, a book containing an alleged libel of
Gregoire, reached the market in 1941, and in several subse-
quent printings sold some 12,300 copies. In March 1944, its
publisher, G. P. Putnam's Sons, began distribution of an
eighth printing. Sales diminished to a point where only 60
copies were distributed from stock in the year immediately
preceding July 1946, when Gregoire instituted suit in New
York complaining of the sale of a single copy of the book dur-
1. Cf. Lewisohn v. Dial Press, Inc., 264 App. Div. 370, 35 N. Y. S.2d
551, 552 (1942) involving a libel action upon a book wherein
defendant pleaded the statute of limitations. There the court was
not applying the single publication rule to books, but merely held
that plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue until the defamatory
statement became false.
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